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Introduction
This paper summarizes an investigation
of the effects of psychological and situation
variables in an experimental game study of
retaliation which was designed to simulate
aspects of accidental nuclear war. Addi-
tional detail may be found in Friedell
(1965).
The study of retaliation is of prime impor-
tance in the context of accidental war. This
is because an accidental war (like any
other) can be thought of as the result of
decisions-probably the result of an escalat-
ing sequence of decisions to retaliate. It is
only the initial stimulus, such as an un-
authorized nuclear detonation, that is an
&dquo;accident.&dquo; Of course, findings on individ-
ual decision-making with regard to retalia-
tion in the laboratory, reported here, are
not directly applicable to nations; nonethe-
less they may supply background for future
work.
Retaliation-aggression instigated by ag-
gression-has an obvious prominence in
interpersonal conflict. But frustration (a
stimulus different from attack) and non-
cooperation (a response different from coun-
ter-attack) have attracted most of the
relevant research. Hence the present study
is somewhat exploratory.
An experimental game with options to
attack and to retaliate was presented to 196
college students. A 2 X 3 factorial design
explored the effects of accidental attack,
expected iteration, social influence, and
timing conditions upon the incidence of
retaliation. Measures of authoritarianism,
orientation to military-political strategy, and
attitudes relating to nuclear war were
obtained. Statistically significant findings
(p ~ .05) were that expected iteration and
social influence inhibited retaliation while
authoritarianism fostered it. The other four
variables did not have significant effects.
The most important finding was that the
possibility of accidental attack did not
appreciably inhibit retaliation.
Hypotheses
The principal independent variables were
selected partly on the basis of plausible
relevance to nuclear decision-making. For-
1 I wish to thank Jack Sawyer and Joe
Harding for their extensive help, and William
Gamson and Michael Inbar for their thoughtful
comments.
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mulation of hypotheses stemmed from the
underlying perspectives that retaliation was
more likely when (a) it could be considered
as deserved, (b) the decision-maker was
tense and lacking an alternative channel of
discharge of tension ( cf. Thibaut and Coules,
1952), and (c) the decision-maker had a
&dquo;rightist&dquo; political orientation.
Situational hypotheses were:
(1) The &dquo;accident&dquo; hypothesis-the
probability of retaliation decreases if the
attack is thought possibly unintentional.
(2) The timing hypothesis-the prob-
ability of retaliation increases if it is known
that there is only a short period after the
attack during which retaliation is possible;
conversely, the probability decreases if there
is an enforced delay before the subject can
retaliate.
(3) The expected iteration hypothesis-
expectation of continuing interaction after
retaliation affects the probability of that
retaliation. Here the expected direction of
effect is unclear. Retaliation may be fos-
tered by the thought that it might deter
future attack; it may be inhibited by the
thought that it might provoke future attack.
( 4 ) The social hypothesis-a person will
be less likely to retaliate if another person
shares his situation, in particular sharing
all gains or losses, but can independently
decide to retaliate. Experimentation on this
hypothesis is related obliquely to classic
social-psychological research on the individ-
ual and the group. It differs both from
together-and-apart experiments and from
group decision-making experiments in that
the outcome for all individuals is determined
by the decision of some single member
(who yet cannot be considered an auto-
cratic leader). Such a social situation, rare
in everyday life, may be of importance for
the development of social-psychological
theory. It is illustrated by a military situa-
tion in which any private’s firing can involve
his platoon in battle.
The principal personality hypothesis was
that authoritarianism is positively correlated
with retaliation. &dquo;Absolutist&dquo; rather than
&dquo;pragmatic&dquo; politico-military strategic per-
spective (the SP scale; cf. Janowitz, 1960)
and assent to cliches such as &dquo;Better dead
than Red&dquo; (the NPNS scale) were also
predicted to encourage retaliation.
Method
THE BASIC EXPERIMENTAL SITUATION
In order to study in the laboratory factors
affecting retaliation, it is necessary to create
a situation in which subjects have the
options of retaliating or declining to retaliate
(declining, for short). Since retaliation may
be defined as &dquo;return of evil for evil,&dquo; the
situation must include culpable attack. It
may be assumed that the victim will hold
the attacker blameworthy if he believes the
attacker knows that the victim will lose
more than the attacker gains. There must
be a plausible motive for the attack-we do
not consider lunatics clearly evil nor do we
retaliate vigorously against them. On the
other hand, it is desirable that there be no
motive in the absence of attack for the
behavior representing retaliation. Other-
wise, it would possess an instrumental value
as well as that of requital. Nuclear retalia-
tion against cities may exemplify such non-
instrumental retaliation.
Most previous laboratory experimentation
in retaliation has involved verbal attack and
response (Buss, 1961, ch. 3). There are
several methodological difficulties in the
use of verbal aggression. Responses are
hard to scale and attacks are difficult to
replicate exactly. If the experimenter pro-
vides the attack, his role as an authority
figure may inhibit retaliation. The use of
an accomplice obviates this difficulty but




is expensive. And it might be hard to make
verbal aggression appear accidental. The
experimental game method, in which sub-
jects deprive each other of money rather
than insult each other, does not pose those
problems and appears to be a superior
approach.
The game employed is perfectly sym-
metric, but let us assume for simplicity of
exposition that player A, the row-chooser,
can only attack, and player B, the column-
chooser, can only retaliate. The payoff
matrix is presented in Table 1. The follow-
ing considerations partially determined the
payoff values:
( 1 ) It was required that a21 > all (A
is motivated to attack).
(2) bll - b21 > a21 - all (B’s loss from
the attack is greater than A’s gain).
( 3 ) b22 < b21 (retaliation costs B some-
thing).
Corresponding to several scenarios for
accidental nuclear war:
( 4 ) a22 < all (B’s retaliation causes A
to experience a net loss).
Finally, following a commonly used
model for the international situation and
most previous experimental game research,
the players should be in symmetrical roles.
Hence:
(5) all = bll, and either player can
attack or retaliate.
The payoffs were to be fixed, if possible,
so that attack would occur with probability
1.0-to maximize the opportunity for re-
taliation-and retaliation would occur with
probability .5-to maximize variance. The
payoff values were of some concern; it was
feared that either there would be few
retaliators among those who had the oppor-
tunity or that potential attackers would
think retaliation highly probable and be
deterred. But the above matrix performed
fairly well by these criteria.
Note the following characteristics of this
matrix:
( 1 ) Attack alone reduces the total wealth
of the subjects by 17.5 percent.
(2) After attack, the attacker has ten
times as much as the victim.
(3) After retaliation, the attacker still
has five cents more than, or one and one-
half times as much as, the victim. To strike
first continues to provide a relative advan-
tage even after the victim has retaliated.
(4) After retaliation, the total wealth of
the subjects is only 12.5 percent of its
original value.
It is seen that from the utilitarian perspec-
tive of the total wealth of the players the
retaliatory attack is far more severe than
the initial attack. Furthermore, while re-
taliation reduces the difference between the
players it does not entirely even the score.
This contrasts with competition in the
Prisoners’ Dilemma, which can profit the
competitor.
The conditions under which subjects were
to play this game had to be prescribed.
Subjects were told that they were participat-
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ing in an experiment on decision-making.
Because of its frivolous connotations the
word &dquo;game&dquo; was never used. Neither was
any reference made to war, since it was
feared that this might introduce symbolic
behavior as an uncontrolled and unmeasured
variable.2
In order to simulate accidental war, the
subjects were allowed to communicate, as
heads of state do. Only communication by
the laborious procedure of writing messages
was allowed, and subjects were isolated
from face-to-face contact during the experi-
ment. The self-recording character of the
written messages was an additional advan-
tage of this technique. The international
analogue is the &dquo;hot line,&dquo; which is a tele-
type system.
Simulating an ongoing situation by one
which must begin at a fixed time is always
a problem. Here, the exact time at which
the game began was unknown to the sub-
jects because there was no starting signal.
They were told that the experiment would
begin within a minute after a switch was
closed and that earlier their buttons (see
below) would be inoperative. This indeter-
minacy was introduced in order to minimize
incentive for a race to preempt-the sub-
jects might have structured the situation as
a contest in speed if there had been a
starting signal. Except in the time-pressure
treatments a trial was ended by a bell-
signal from a timer (which the subjects
could see) after ten minutes, but a subject
was always given at least five minutes to
retaliate, lest an attack be delayed until
just before the bell in order not to give the
victim a chance to respond.
The subjects acted by pushing buttons:
FIG. 1. Schematic view of apparatus box.
if a subject’s button was pushed first it
meant attack (a &dquo;strike&dquo;), if second it meant
retaliation. What had happened was in-
dicated to a subject by which one of five
lights was lit on an apparatus box which
separated the subjects. The arrangement of
the lights is indicated schematically in
Figure 1.3 The arrows show possible transi-
tions. A trial could terminate in any of the
five positions. Only one strike and one
retaliation were allowed. The electrical
apparatus also provided a convenient way
to produce accidents, and perhaps a curi-
osity motive for attack.
In short, retaliation was operationalized
as pushing the button second, where the
retaliator knew that this would cost him
5 cents and cost the other $1.35. The
average subject indicated that he would
work over an hour to earn $1.35; this
appeared to be long enough to make the
loss of this amount an &dquo;evil.&dquo; Conceivably
the victim is rich and does not care, but
the retaliator has no way of knowing this.
Support for the proposition that pushing
the button second is a valid instance of
retaliation also comes from retaliators’ re-
sponses to the question, &dquo;In your decision
to push your button second, how important
were these factors?&dquo; Eighty-two percent
gave responses definitely indicating requital.
2 A few subjects had had a course which
enabled them to recognize the game character
of the experiment, but I saw very little aware-
ness of any reference to war.
3 Actually, the labels for the lights indicated
who had pushed and repeated the payoff
scheme; the words "struck" and "retaliated"
were not used.




The hypotheses were tested by varying
the basic experimental situation and by use
of questionnaires.
In &dquo;accident&dquo; (A) treatments subjects
were read the following4 in their instruc-
tions :
There is a small chance that the lights will
show that one of you pushed your button first
when it didn’t really happen. In that case one
person will gain and the other lose just as if
a person had actually pushed his button. And
the person who lost can push second.
The only lie subjects were told was about
the &dquo;small chance&dquo;-actually, an accident
would usually occur if no subject attacked,
about three minutes after the starting switch
was operated. (Whether an accident oc-
curred or not, &dquo;accident&dquo; treatments were
distinguished from others by introducing
the possibility of accident.) There was
frequently considerable doubt as to whether
or not an accident had occurred.5
In the time-pressure (P) treatments sub-
jects were told:
The experiment ends when the bell rings,
about 10 minutes after it starts, except that you
will have always and only about 25 seconds to
decide whether to push your button second.
Then the lights on the box will go out.
This time limit was designed to put con-
siderable pressure on the subject while yet
allowing him ample opportunity to act.
In the enforced-delay or &dquo;wait&dquo; (W)
treatments the instructions were:
The experiment ends when the bell rings,
about 10 minutes after it starts, except that you
will never have less than 5 minutes to decide
whether to push your button second. However,
you must wait about 2 minutes after the other
person has pushed his button in order to press
your button second.
In the &dquo;free&dquo; (F) treatments, where
neither time-pressure nor enforced-delay
obtained, subjects were told only the first
sentence in the foregoing instructions.
In the expected iteration (I) treatments,
subjects were told: &dquo;The experiment will
be done over again once, with another
dollar [as stake].&dquo; (The trial was actually
iterated to ascertain what effect their expe-
rience would have.) Otherwise, the instruc-
tion was: &dquo;The experiment will not be
repeated.&dquo;
The instructions for the &dquo;social&dquo; (D)
treatments, with a dyad on each side of the
apparatus box, had to be somewhat more
complicated. Before receiving the general
instructions, the subjects were told:
First, would each of you pretend that you
are the only person on your side and that there
is only one person on the other side, while I
read the instructions.
This permitted the tetrads in social treat-
ments to be given the same instructions as
others, insofar as possible. After receiving
all the instructions for the corresponding
nonsocial treatment, they were told:
Now, there are actually two of you on each
side. Either person on a side can press his
side’s button, in which case he gains or loses
just as if he were the only person on his side,
and each person on the other side loses just as
if he were the only person on that side. It does
not matter which person on a side actually
presses the button-both persons on a side
always gain or lose equally.
If you wish to press the button, the other
person on your side does not have to agree.
You can’t talk with him, but you can exchange
messages. If you agree with a message he sends
to the other side, sign your initials to it.
4 The instructions were modified slightly dur-
ing the experiment. This and other minor
irregularities are discussed in Friedell (1965).
5 After the trial, subjects in A treatments who
were victims of strikes or accidents were asked
to indicate on a 5-point scale their responses
to: "Do you think he really pushed his but-
ton?" Answers were: No = 1, 12 Ss; 2, 2 Ss;
3, 5 Ss; 4, 5 Ss; 5 = Yes, 4 Ss.
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Each member of a tetrad began with his
own $1.00 stake. &dquo;Partners&dquo; were told to
communicate in writing to provide a record
of their interaction; this also functioned to
prevent the other side from hearing them.
(They seemed generally to conceive of
themselves as a team.)
The attitude items, and some others to
be discussed below, were administered in
a mail questionnaire sent to the subjects
from a few days to about a month after they
had participated in the experiment. The
delay was intended to obviate a possible
halo effect from the trial. The return rate
was very high (92 percent).
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
The twenty-four possible treatments ob-
tainable from the situational variations were
to be presented in a 23 X 3 factorial design
with four replications of nonsocial treat-
ments and two replications of social treat-
ments in order to maximize information
obtained. For various reasons this design
was not perfectly implemented, but the
number of replications of each treatment
approximates that given.
The subjects met the experimenter (the
author) in a large room in which the
experiment was to be conducted or at the
door to the building at a time prearranged
by telephone. They were seated on opposite
sides of a table holding the apparatus box.
(Two were on each side in social treat-
ments.) In social treatments where a pair
of subjects knew each other, this pair was
assigned to the same side. Subjects were
then asked their names, and (if this could
not be ascertained from observation)
whether they knew each other. Trials were
excluded where Ss on opposite sides were
well acquainted.
In front of each subject were placed
$1.00 in change and a colored pen and
colored paper for writing messages. Each
side had a spindle on which to place mes-
sages, a reminder card succinctly stating
the payoff scheme, and a pushbutton.
The subjects were then read the following
general instructions:
Thank you for coming to take part in this
decision experiment. Each of you has a push-
button ; we want to know whether or not you
push the button. I will tell you what the
buttons do. It is complicated, but it is impor-
tant for you to completely understand. So feel
free to ask questions at any time.
Each of you has $1.00 to start with. It is
on the table in front of you. How much you
take home depends on what you do with the
buttons. You can push them whenever you
want, or not at all.
You will not know just when the experiment
starts, but it will start a little less than a minute
after I operate the switch. Before that the
buttons will not do anything. So, if you press
your button right after I operate the switch,
nothing will happen.
After the experiment has started, the person
who pushes his button first gets an extra 50
cents, and the other person loses 85 cents. The
person who pushes his button first then has
$1.50, and the other is down to 15 cents.
You can push your button second, if the
other person has pushed his button first. Then,
you lose another 5 cents, but he loses $1.35. So
you have 10 cents left, and he has 15 cents left.
Remember that pushing your button first
gives you 50 cents, and takes 85 cents away
from the other person. Pushing your button
second costs you 5 cents and takes $1.35 away
from the other person.
The lights on the box show what has hap-
pened. The white light will be on to start
with because neither of you have pressed your
buttons. The arrows show what might happen
next.
Now I am going to ask each of you some
questions to make sure you understand what
the buttons do.
Suppose you wait for a minute and push
your button before the other person pushes his.
How much do you get?
If you push your button right away when I
operate the switch, what will happen?
Suppose the other person pushed his button
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and made you lose 85 cents. Then if you push
your button, how much will it cost you?
Suppose the other person pushed his button
and made you lose 85 cents. Then, if you push
your button, how much will it cost him?
Here are some details to remember:
You are not allowed to talk, except to me,
but you can send messages. Use the pen and
paper in front of you. Give each message to
me and I will give it to the other person. Put
all messages you receive on your spindle.
[Then the timing, iteration, and accident in-
structions were given, according to the treat-
ment. Finally, subjects were told:] ]
One more detail-if the other person has
just pushed his button, you have to wait a few
seconds before yours will do anything.6
Remember:
At no time are you required to push the
button.
All amounts gained or lost come from or go
to the experimenter, not the other person.
There is a small chance that the lights will
show that one of you pushed first when he
didn’t. It still counts as if he had.7
[Final instructions to tetrads were inserted
here.] ]
Are there any questions?
Now I will turn the switch and we will begin.
After questions were answered the trial
began. During the experiment, button-
pushing and its timing were noted, as well
as other behaviors of particular interest.
After the completion of a trial, the subjects
were given a postinterview asking the rea-
sons for their behaviors, whether they had
heard anything about the experiment, their
perception of the experimenter’s bias, their
image of the situation, their surprise at
events in the game, whether they thought
an attack was accidental (in A treatments)
and what their behavior would have been
in certain contingencies. In I treatments
each subject was given another dollar before
the repetition, and there was another post-
interview. Finally, the subjects were told
not to talk about the experiment, asked to
fill out and return the mail questionnaire
(measuring the personality variables, as
well as demographic characteristics and
some miscellaneous items), and dismissed.
SUBJECTS
The design called for 192 subjects. (Each
subject was used only once.) There was no
feasible way to make participation compul-
sory, so it was necessary to obtain a large,
fairly homogenous population from which
to recruit volunteers. The population of
male undergraduates at Northwestern Uni-
versity satisfied this requirement, and sub-
jects were recruited and the experiment
conducted there. Approximately 10 to 15
percent of the subjects were obtained from
announcements made in political science
classes; the rest were obtained from notices
in dormitories. Both groups were told that
it would be a laboratory decision-making
experiment, and the importance of these
experiments was sketched. They were told
the experiment would last from 30 to 45
minutes, and that they could gain up to
$3.00 for participating. The political sci-
ence students were also told that this would
be an opportunity to gain first-hand expe-
rience with this research method. It is
estimated that about 20 percent of the
population reached by the announcements
volunteered. Subjects were recruited and
run in the spring and summer of 1964.
What were the 196 participants like? The
mail questionnaire revealed a modal age of
19, approximately equal proportions of
liberal Democrats, liberal Republicans, and
conservative Republicans, and a slight
average tendency to disagree with the 14
F-scale items used (mean: -.45; s.d. : .88).
Fifty-three percent listed money as a pri-
mary reason for volunteering; 36 percent
6 In F and P treatments, in order to avoid
counting an intended attack as retaliation.
7 In A treatments.
364
TABLE 2
MARGINALS: PROPORTIONS OF RETALIATING TRIALS*
* The number of trials with opportunities to retaliate is in parentheses.
listed curiosity or the interest of the experi-
ment as primary, with money perhaps as
a secondary reason. Surprisingly, 62 percent
of the respondents said that they would
work an hour or longer to earn a dollar.
Findings
TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
The effect of the principal independent
variables upon retaliation will be examined
by comparing two disjoint subgroups of
the subject population-retaliators and de-
cliners.8 Numbers of retaliating and declin-
ing trials will also be compared. The dis-
tinction between subjects and trials is made
because, in social treatments, a declining
trial produced two decliners, while in non-
social treatments a declining trial produced
one decliner; only persons who, themselves,
pushed second are counted as retaliators.
There were 22 retaliators, 31 declining
trials and 43 decliners.
The Data. The most important data are
shown in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2 shows that the accident treatment
had an effect opposite to that expected; ex-
pected iteration inhibited retaliation; along
with enforced-delay, time-pressure inhibited
retaliation; social treatments inhibited in-
dividual retaliation. Table 3 shows that the
F-score had a relatively strong positive
correlation with retaliation; the effect of
strategic perspective was weaker; NPNS
seemed actually to inhibit retaliation.
Statistical Analysis. Before interpreting
these results it is necessary to ascertain
whether the effects of one variable were
suppressed or enhanced by those of another
and to test for statistical significance.
A powerful statistical procedure which is
unequivocally applicable to the present
hypotheses and data has not yet been
developed. Therefore, a variety of tech-
niques were used.
First, the personality variables will be
examined. If it is assumed that accident
can never increase retaliation and that
NPNS and SP can never decrease it, regard-
less of the values of the other variables, one
can infer that NPNS had no independent
effect on retaliation. When F-score is
partialed out, retaliation correlates only
.042 with accident and .050 with strategic
perspective.
As would be expected from the experi-
mental design, little correlation appeared
between F-score and assignment of subjects
to different timing, iteration, and social
conditions. The correlation r( 38,71) =.339
may now be tested for significance by the
z-test (z = r(N-1) ’AI), which yields z =
2.65; a t-test on the difference between
F-scale means (.587) yields t60df = 2.75.
Either test indicates significance at better
than the .005 level, one-tailed.
8 Behavior during the repetition in I treat-
ments will not be discussed except in "Miscel-
laneous Findings" below.
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TABLE 3
CORRELATIONS AMONG PRINCIPAL VARIABLES FOR RETALIATORS AND DECLINERS
Sample size = 57-65.
* Var. -76 = 1 in D treatments, = 0 in D’ treatments
-42 = 1 in A treatments, = 0 in A’ treatments
-43 = 1 in I treatments, = 0 in I’ treatments
44 = 2 in P treatments, = 1 in F treatments, = 0 in W treatments
38 = 1 for retaliators, = 0 for decliners.
The variables are numbered as in Friedell (1965) to facilitate reference.
Now the treatment variables will be con-
sidered. When the 12 signs of differences
in proportions retaliating in treatments dif-
fering only on the I variable are compared,
expected iteration is found significantly to
inhibit retaliation (p = .04, two-tailed).
With regard to the social variable, the
hypothesis of particular interest is not that
of absence of social effect on probability
of retaliation per trial, but rather that of
no effect on probability of retaliation per
subject. Since two subjects share the op-
portunity to retaliate in each D trial con-
sidered here, this null hypothesis states that
x, the probability of retaliation in a D’ trial,
corresponds to the probability 1- ( 1-x ) of
retaliation in a comparable D trial.9 9 It
appears reasonable to pool all the I and
all the I’ observations in testing the social
hypothesis. Then sample sizes are large
enough so that x2 y (chi-square with Yates’
correction) may be computed, with ex-
pected observations determined by the
maximum likelihood probabilities under the
null hypothesis; the x2 y values from the I
and the I’ observations can be added to
give an overall x2 with two degrees of free-
dom. The value obtained is x2 y = 6.00 (p
=.05). 
Discussion. It was found that authoritar-
ianism increased the propensity to retaliate,
that partnership inhibited individual retalia-
tion,10 and that expected iteration decreased
retaliation. None of these results is surpris-
ing. Nor is it surprising, in retrospect, that
the P effect was opposite to that predicted
(although it must be noted that, when
retaliation occurred in F treatments, it
usually occurred before a P trial would have
terminated). The experimenter’s informal
observation supported the alternative hy-
pothesis that the subjects were somewhat
immobilized, though probably more because
they were trying to digest what was going
on than because of felt pressure to make
a decision. It should be noted that they
were distracted by the experimenter passing
money back and forth, although this oc-
curred in all timing conditions. As for
NPNS, and the weak and nonindependent
effect of SP: as will be discussed below, it
does not seem that retaliators are &dquo;rightist.&dquo;
It will be argued that this is nevertheless
consistent with their high F-scores. Com-
pare observations by McClintock et al.,9 In two of the 18 D trials in Table 2, those
able to retaliate knew each other; retaliation
occurred in one of them. These trials are pooled
with the others in the analysis.
10 Compare a somewhat similar finding in
Pylyshyn et al. (1966).
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using an asymmetric game, which suggested
&dquo;that Internationalists may be more respon-
sive to variations in their opponents’ strat-
egy. They tended, more than Isolationists,
to punish a previously competitive opponent
and to reward a previously cooperative
one&dquo; (Gallo and McClintock, 1965; italics
mine).
The lack of effect of the A treatment is
the most unexpected finding.
OTHER FINDINGS
Communication and Retaliation. Mes-
sages and their absence play a vital part in
the process leading to retaliation or declin-
ing (ef. Deutsch, 1958). In A treatments
there can be communications about whether
or not the attack was intentional. Messages
can convey a very reasonable alternative to
retaliation, an offer to split 50-50. (This
would involve the striker giving 67.5 cents
to the victim, and indeed most offers to
split suggested amounts close to this. There
seemed to be little concern over odd pennies
or nickels.) A less adequate alternative to
retaliation that was occasionally suggested
was &dquo;alternation&dquo;-that the victim push
first next time. This occurred when sub-
jects did not realize it would be best not
to push at all.
In A treatments an accident occurred
fourteen times and a strike occurred seven-
teen times. No subject lied about the occur-
rence of strike. In ten of the fourteen trials
in which an accident occurred, the profiters
sent spontaneous messages to the effect that
they did not push the button. In two cases,
the victims asked whether the other side
pushed the button. In one of the above
cases both occurred simultaneously. In
these eleven cases the assertion of accident
tended to be believed. In the three cases
where an accident occurred and there was
no discussion of this sort, there was more
doubt. When a strike occurred there was
only one case in which the possibility of
accident was discussed-it was admitted
that a strike had happened, but the victim
declined. Nobody asked if it was an ac-
cident, received the answer &dquo;No,&dquo; and then
retaliated. There was no meaningful cor-
relation between retaliation and the belief
that a strike had occurred.
It was thought that the passage of mes-
sages between sides might reduce retalia-
tion. This effect existed but was not statis-
tically significant. The occurrence of an
accident did stimulate messages.
There were nineteen cases in which a
suggestion about splitting or alternating
was received before the end of a trial.
Figure 2 shows who initiated discussion of
an arrangement and what the outcome of
the trial was. Once discussion was initiated,
retaliation rarely ensued. The three excep-
tions occurred in tetrad trials. In one there
were no messages to give a clue to the
reasons for rejection; in fact, it is possible
that retaliation occurred before the message
was received. In another case the striking
side rejected a demand for alternation; in
the third the victims rejected an unusually
low offer of 15 cents each by the striking
side.
To conclude: the occurrence, rather than
the mere possibility, of accident did tend
to depress retaliation. (Ratios on a per
trial basis were .36 when accident occurred
and .50 otherwise, excluding the three
trials covered in note b to Figure 2.) And
when retaliation occurred after accident,
the process tended to involve the victim
retaliating before he got a message that it
was an accident, let alone a suggestion for
a deal. Further, the victim of an accident
suggested a deal only once, although in
cases where strike occurred the victim often
did so. This is probably due to the greater
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FIG. 2. Initiators and outcomes of arrangements. Notes: (a) Includes both A and A’ treat-
ments. (b) Three trials are included where the strike was suggested by the victim as part of an
arrangement to alternate. In no trial did a subject suggest that he himself strike first as part of
such an arrangement.
readiness of profiters from accident to
initiate negotiations.
Miscellaneous Findings. Surprise by the
attack was correlated with retaliation (r =
.284, N = 65).
Retaliators ranked about equally the fol-
lowing explanations: &dquo;It wouldn’t be right
for him to go away with $1.50;&dquo; &dquo;showing
him that he couldn’t get away with that
kind of behavior;&dquo; and &dquo;not wanting to sit
and do nothing.&dquo; Next came anger. Curi-
osity and fulfillment of commitment ranked
lowest as reasons for retaliation. In I trials,
deterrence was the most prominent reason.
Actually, retaliation tended to be somewhat
provocative.
Subjects, such as the strikers, who were
not confronted with the decision whether
to retaliate were asked what they would
have done. There was little similarity (r =
.153) between correlations with retaliation
and with &dquo;would-be&dquo; retaliation.
The absence of similarity between would-
be retaliation and real retaliation casts doubt
on the applicability of findings such as
those in Deutsch (1960) to makers of real
decisions. This dissimiliarity may be rele-
vant to the absence of correlation between
retaliation and SP and NPNS, which also
do not deal with overt aggressive behavior.
Portrait of the Retaliator. At the begin-
ning of this investigation it was thought that
retaliators tended to have impulsive, aggres-
sive personalities. Thus the prediction that
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their hostility against outgroups (in which
they would presumably place the strikers)
would result in a high F-score. It was
thought that, since retaliation on the per-
sonal and the national level probably shared
some common roots, high NPNS and SP
scores should result. Since most of these
propositions were disconfirmed, it is clear
that the personality of the retaliator must
be reexamined. The data obtained will
suggest a more accurate and refined ideal
type for the retaliator, although one that is,
of course, highly tentative.
The revised picture of the retaliator, in
contrast to the decliner, is that of a person
with a belief in force, a tendency toward
moralism, and a tendency toward interac-
tive isolation from others. He tends to
believe that:
An insult to our honor should always be
punished.
America is getting so far away from the true
American way of life that force may be neces-
sary to restore it.
People can be divided into two distinct
classes: the weak and the strong.
Most pointedly, he does not consider non-
violent demonstrations to promote racial
equality desirable, but he does feel that
racial desegregation should be accomplished
throughout the US by all means in the
power of the federal government, including
force if necessary.11 (The common factor
is obvious in retrospect, although entirely
unanticipated.) This belief in force must
not be equated with destructiveness and
cynicism. The retaliator would deny, more
than the decliner, the proposition that,
human nature being what it is, there will
always be war and conflict. Nor should
it be equated with a rightist political atti-
tude, as is shown by the results on that
question.
The retaliator’s moralism is shown by his
opposition to people who do not love their
parents and, most strikingly, by his concep-
tion of the situation as a problem in trust
and even as a problem in cooperation, in
contrast to a business or bargaining prob-
lem. He was surprised when the other side
pushed first. While anger was important
in his decision to retaliate, even more impor-
tant was the feeling that it wouldn’t be
right for the other person to go away with
$1.50.
While the retaliator takes a somewhat
personal approach to the situation, in the
sense that &dquo;revenge&dquo; is more personal than
&dquo;business,&dquo; he would tend to use rather
abstract terms in characterizing the problem
it poses. He is more likely to view the
situation as either &dquo;cooperation&dquo; or &dquo;com-
petition&dquo; than in the more concrete inter-
active fashion suggested by the concept of
&dquo;bargaining.&dquo; He does not see the situation
as a problem in &dquo;human relations&dquo; and he
does not initiate suggestions about splitting.
The moralism, emphasis on force, and
deemphasis of interaction, indeed, are
aspects of the authoritarian personality, but
the retaliator in this study does not appear
to be cynical or projective. (If projective,
he presumably would not be surprised at
the strike.)
Recall that retaliators were a self-selected
pacific group in that they usually chose not
to attempt a first strike. Compared to
strikers, they viewed the situation as one
of trust and cooperation. (Reaction to
perceived betrayal of trust, indeed, may be
a major factor in retaliation.) This kind of
self-selection is of social importance, how-
ever ; perhaps when a potential retaliator
is found in a peaceful social situation he
usually is not also the equivalent of a striker
11 Fifty-nine percent of the retaliators, in
contrast to 30 percent of the decliners and 31
percent of all subjects who responded to the
question on segregation, circled this response.
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-otherwise the situation would not often
be peaceful. This apparent contradiction
describes, of course, the national posture of
the US: pledged to retaliate, but not to
strike first.
The Striker. Other variables generally
did not differentiate between those who
struck and those who kept their original
dollar (&dquo;cooperators&dquo;). The 39 strikers,
however, tended to view the situation more
competitively than others and not to be
would-be retaliators. On the other hand,
those who cited gaining 50 cents as an
important reason for striking were more
authoritarian (r = .430), more &dquo;rightist&dquo;
in political attitudes, and higher on NPNS
than were those who gave this reason less
importance. In contrast to the correlations
of retaliation with F-scale items related to
force, striking to gain 50 cents correlated
most strongly with F-scale items related to
discipline. These data suggest that strikers
are more typical authoritarians than retalia-
tors.
Military Subjects. Nine trials of the ex-
periment were performed with managerial
Air Force officers. Only one retaliation
occurred, and that one stemmed from rest-
lessness and curiosity. The officers were
thus less likely to retaliate than the North-
western subjects.
Concluding Discussion
In this final section, findings from the
study will be compared with previous
research and theory and certain of its
implications will be examined.
ACCIDENTAL ATTACK AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
The finding that the possibility of acci-
dent did not appreciably inhibit retaliation
may be used to support the frustration-
aggression hypothesis-for it is perhaps just
as frustrating to be suddenly deprived of
85 cents (for which, recall, the subjects were
willing to work a considerable length of
time) when the deprivation is accidental
as when it is deliberate. However, research
has strongly challenged the applicability of
that hypothesis to situations like this. There
are two related criticisms. First, it has been
proposed that attack is an antecedent of
aggression, and, indeed, a stronger instigator
than frustration. Karl Menninger has stated,
&dquo;Anyone who has had his toe stepped on,
which is certainly not a frustration, knows
how inadequate such a formula [the frustra-
tion-aggression hypothesis] is&dquo; (quoted by
Berkowitz, 1962, p. 29). There has been
little empirical research comparing attack
to frustration as an instigator of aggression,
but Buss (1961, p. 32) cites a dissertation
by J. Gillespie as providing results that
&dquo;are clear in indicating that verbal attack
is a more potent antecedent of aggression
than frustration.&dquo; However, attack can be
conceived as a form of frustration, e.g.,
&dquo;the interruption of an internal response
sequence&dquo; (Berkowitz, 1962, p. 30). Re-
gardless of whether attack is subsumed
under frustration, it would appear from
this that more retaliation should be expected
in nonaccident than in accident treatments.
The Dollard theory has also been accused
of neglecting arbitrariness of frustration as
a variable affecting the instigation of aggres-
sion. Pastore and others have found that
&dquo;nonarbitrary&dquo; frustrating situations elicit
significantly less aggression than when the
frustration is arbitrary or unreasonable.
Pastore (1952) and Rothaus and Worchel
(1960) included unintentional frustrations
in their nonarbitrary lists. Thus their find-
ings would suggest that accident depresses
retaliation. Three objections to this con-
clusion can be raised. First, exposure to
arbitrary frustration may be more frustrat-
ing, blocking more response sequences, than
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exposure to nonarbitrary frustration-be-
cause, if frustration is less expected, more
internal response sequences may be antic-
ipatorily set in motion. This objection
clearly applies to one of Pastore’s ten
arbitrary frustrating situations, and perhaps
to more. Berkowitz (1962, pp. 68-72)
interprets the findings of other studies to
substantiate the hypothesis that expected
frustrations instigate less aggression. In the
present experiment, surprise was just as
great in the accident as in the nonaccident
treatments. Thus, insofar as unexpectedness
rather than arbitrariness is the variable to
which subjects were responding in the
Pastore and in the Rothaus and Worchel
experiments, their results were not incon-
sistent with mine.
A second objection is that the Pastore
and the Rothaus and Worchel experiments
used only questionnaire descriptions of
hypothetical situations. The question then
is raised whether a social desirability factor
biased their responses toward ones that
seemed acceptable. Note that in the present
study the correlates of would-be retaliation
were quite different from those of actual
retaliation. A study by Allison and Hunt
(1959) is quite interestingly related to the
accident finding. Subjects were given
hypothetical frustrating situations that were
&dquo;justified,&dquo; &dquo;unjustified,&dquo; and &dquo;unspecified,&dquo;
and were divided into two groups on the
basis of low or high propensity to give
socially desirable responses. The aggression
scores were in the expected directions. Both
groups rated the unspecified situations
closer to the unjustified than to the justified,
this effect being most pronounced in the
low social desirability group. If the re-
sponses of the low group are taken as more
suggestive of behavioral responses than
those of the high group, and accident treat-
ment is taken as &dquo;unspecified&dquo; while the
nonaccident treatment is &dquo;unjustified&dquo; frus-
tration, the results approach consistency
with mine.
A final objection to Pastore’s conclusions
is that some of Pastore’s and Rothaus and
Worchel’s nonarbitrary frustrators were, so
to speak, unfortunate. Four of Pastore’s
ten nonarbitrary frustrating situations fell
into this category. (E.g., &dquo;Your date phones
at the last minute and breaks the appoint-
ment because she [or he] had suddenly
become ill.&dquo;) Aggression should be in-
hibited here as an injury to a &dquo;loved&dquo; object.
It is quite likely that aggression toward
unfortunate frustrators is often inhibited,
because of conscience and social norms, and
because aggressive needs are satisfied
covertly by contemplating the misfortune.
(Aggression toward minority groups ap-
pears to be an exception, but consider the
myths of the &dquo;happy Negro&dquo; and the &dquo;rich
Jew.&dquo;) Pastore’s published data do not
permit isolation of the effects of unfortunate
frustrators from others. While differences
on all his items were in the expected direc-
tion, most of the effect may have resulted
from those involving unfortunate frustrators.
In the present experiment, in both accident
and nonaccident treatments, the frustrator
profited. Thus, to the extent that mis-
fortune accounted for the variance in
Pastore’s responses, his study and mine can
be reconciled.
On the whole, the foregoing discussion
suggests that the A treatment should
decrease retaliation, but perhaps not very
much; sampling variation may complete the
explanation of the data.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXPERIMENTAL-
GAME METHODOLOGY
The present research bears on the follow-
ing five questions:
( 1 ) How does the subject’s utility for
money affect his behavior? This is related
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to the unanswered question of how well
the results obtained with games played for
pennies could be replicated in games played
for dollars or in situations with &dquo;real-life&dquo;
stakes. &dquo;There is at least some evidence that
changing the size of, say, monetary rewards
(within the limits of what experimenters
can afford) does not alter the behavior of
subjects significantly&dquo; (Snyder, 1963, p.
13). In this study it was found that a scale
measuring marginal utility for money as
contrasted with utility for time showed
slight correlation with retaliation, with
strike, and with striking for gain. A mod-
erate though not significant negative cor-
relation was found with striking from fear
of loss, which can probably be disregarded.
These results support the hypothesis that,
within limits, utility for money does not
affect game behavior.
(2) How much of game behavior can
be explained by differential mathematical
ability, a factor that may be irrelevant in
many contexts? The number of mathematics
courses the present subjects had taken was
no more than slightly correlated with any
behavior. This is consistent with an impres-
sionistic finding of Scodel’s reported by
Lutzker (1960).
(3) How much does the fact that sub-
jects frequently are volunteers affect experi-
mental game results? The distinguishing
personality characteristics of volunteers vary
with what they think they are volunteering
for.
Martin and Marcuse (1958) found no
significant (p < .05) difference on the traits
of intelligence, anxiety, ethnocentrism, self-
sufficiency, introversion-extroversion, dom-
inance-submission, or sociability between
volunteers and nonvolunteers for a learning
experiment. However, differences between
volunteers and nonvolunteers for hypnosis
and personality experiments emerged. The
present decision-making experiment is prob-
ably perceived to be more like a learning
experiment than like the others if the rele-
vant dimension is that of being emotionally
loaded. Thus the cited study suggests that
little relevant selective effect occurred from
the use of volunteers.
A more direct investigation of the mean-
ing of volunteering is possible. In the mail
questionnaire, subjects were asked why they
volunteered. Responses were grouped into
those giving money as a primary reason and
those who mentioned interest or curiosity
(some of whom also gave money as a
reason). If the fact of volunteering is
important, one would expect that the reason
for volunteering would also be. Conversely,
if the reason for volunteering does not
covary with behavior, this tends to suggest
that volunteers are not a special group.
There was no correlation between reason
for volunteering and retaliation. If strike
and striking for gain are considered, there
is still little correlation with reason for
volunteering. Curiously, the correlation be-
tween reason for volunteering and utility
for money was .000. Volunteering for
money increases the correlation between
authoritarianism and retaliation to .422 (N
= 34) from .147 (N = 26), but the data
generally support the impression from the
Martin and Marcuse study.
(4) The previous topics have dealt with
characteristics of the subjects. The remain-
ing two deal with the experimental situation.
Is it important whether subjects play with
real or imaginary money? The latter situa-
tion is generally, although not inevitably,
the least expensive for the experimenter.
Gallo and McClintock’s (1965) results in
a Deutsch-type simulated trucking game
suggest that, where cooperation is profitable
but competition is interesting, subjects will
tend to be competitive with low or imagi-
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TABLE 4
nary payoff scales. This is pertinent to topic
(1) above, and also to the distinction be-
tween the present would-be retaliators and
retaliators. In the two-person trials, retalia-
tion occurred during 46 percent of the
opportunities; 46 percent to 57 percent of
the subjects are estimated to be potential
retaliators.12 Among strikers and coopera-
tors we have the results shown in Table 4.
The figures are comparable with those for
actual retaliation but, as indicated above,
the causes may be different.
( 5 ) Finally, there is the question of how
&dquo;demand characteristics&dquo; (cf. Ome, 1961)
-the subjects’ perceptions of the experi-
menter’s desires-affect outcomes. There
was a trend toward correspondence between
button-pushing and the belief that I, the
experimenter, wanted the button pushed.
If negative, neutral, and positive responses
to the question &dquo;Do you think I wanted you
to push the button?&dquo; are scored -1, 0, and
1, respectively, the means for retaliators,
strikers, and others are .27, .13 and .02,
respectively. Comparison of within-trial
and between-trial responses suggests that
differential perceptions of my desires were
internally motivated. Would-be retaliation
was uncorrelated with the question about
what I wanted. Assuming that a trend
toward congruence between behaviors and
the experimenter’s perceived desires is
validly reflected here, whether the latter
should be controlled for depends on the
object of inquiry. In most cases, as long
as the stimulus from the experimenter is
actually constant, the subjects’ perceptions
should be allowed to vary freely as an
intrinsic correlate of behavior. Of interest
is the moralistic response from several of
the subjects that I shouldn’t have cared
whether they pushed the button. Others
asked whether the &dquo;I&dquo; in the question
referred to me, although there was no one
else to whom it could have referred. It
seems that the raising of this question con-
flicted with a narrow cognitive set about
psychological experiments possessed by
these students.
Implications for the Problem
of Accidental War
After all this speculation, theory, and
data on interpersonal retaliation and related
topics, the reader may wonder if the results
have any relevance for problems of acci-
dental war. The difficulty in generalizing
is obvious, but one topic of especial rele-
vance to the relationship between the ex-
perimental findings and nuclear war will
be discussed.
How are individuals who vary on the
measures that have been discussed here
differentially selected to major decision-
making roles, particularly that of the Pres-
idency ? Lasswell (1954, pp. 221-23) sug-
gests that authoritarian personalities are
likely to be relegated to minor political roles
in both democratic and established, indus-
trialized totalitarian societies. He argues
mainly from the rigid compulsiveness of the
authoritarian, and his argument is thus more
appropriate to the discipline-oriented striker
than to the force-oriented retaliator who
may be more flexible in responding to
others. One could speculate on the moral-
ism characterizing America’s political stance,
12 The discrepancy is explained by the selec-
tive process leading to the opportunity to
retaliate. See Friedell (1965).
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its refusal self-consciously to initiate aggres-
sion, and its relatively blind pugnacity when
highly aroused. Such speculation would be
entirely inconclusive as evidence that re-
taliators are selected as leaders by American
political processes. The point, rather, is
that such a possibility cannot be deprecated
by pointing to mechanisms that reject
typical authoritarians.
The most statistically significant finding
from this research was that retaliators were
higher F-scorers, on the average, than
decliners. The most important finding,
however, if importance is taken to be the
product of unexpectedness, degree of veri-
fication, and meaningful implications, is
probably that introducing the possibility of
accident did not inhibit retaliation.
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